Robust monetary policy in the New-Keynesian framework by Leitemo, Kai & Söderström , Ulf
BANK OF FINLAND 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
31 • 2004 
Kai Leitemo – Ulf Söderström 
Research Department 
30.12.2004 
Robust monetary policy in the 
New-Keynesian framework 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 























































 + 358 10 8311 
 
http://www.bof.fi BANK OF FINLAND 
DISCUSSION PAPERS  
 
31 • 2004 
Kai Leitemo* – Ulf Söderström** 
Research Department 
30.12.2004 
Robust monetary policy 
in the New-Keynesian framework 
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Bank of Finland. 
*  Norwegian School of Management (BI), P.O. Box 580, 1302 Sandvika, Norway. e-mail: 
kai.leitemo@bi.no 
**  Department of Economics and IGIER, Università Bocconi, Via Salasco 5, 20136 Milano, 
Italy. e-mail: ulf.soderstrom@uni-bocconi.it. 
 
Financial support from the Financial Market Fund, a program under the Norwegian Research 
Council, is gratefully acknowledged. We are also grateful for comments from Paolo Giordani, 
Juha Kilponen, Tom Sargent, Paul Söderlin, Juha Tarkka and Jouko Vilmunen, as well as 
participants at the Bank of Finland workshop in May 2004 and the University of Copenhagen 
Conference on Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory in June 2004. In particular, we thank Carl 
Walsh for many insightful comments. 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 

























































Helsinki 2004  
3 
Robust monetary policy in the New-Keynesian 
framework 
Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 31/2004 





We study the effects of model uncertainty in a simple New-Keynesian model 
using robust control techniques. Due to the simple model structure, we are able to 
find closed-form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing both 
instrument rules and targeting rules under different timing assumptions. In all 
cases but one, an increased preference for robustness makes monetary policy 
respond more aggressively to cost shocks but leaves the response to demand 
shocks unchanged. As a consequence, inflation is less volatile and output is more 
volatile than under a non-robust policy. Under one particular timing assumption, 
however, increasing the preference for robustness has no effect on the optimal 
targeting rule (nor on the economy). 
 
Key words: Knightian uncertainty, model uncertainty, robust control, min-max 
policies 
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4 
Robusti rahapolitiikka uusi-keynesiläisessä 
makromallissa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 31/2004 





Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan malliepävarmuuden vaikutuksia modernissa makro-
mallissa käyttäen robustin kontrollin menetelmiä. Robusti rahapolitiikan korko- ja 
tavoitesääntö voidaan mallissa ratkaista eksplisiittisesti turvautumatta numeerisiin 
ratkaisuihin, koska mallin rakenne on riittävän yksinkertainen. Robustin ohjaus-
säännön ominaisuuksia tarkastellaan kahdessa tapahtumien kalenterointia koske-
vassa tapauksessa. Tarkasteluissa käy ilmi, että yhtä tapausta lukuun ottamatta 
keskupankin voimakkaasti tavoittelemana robustisuus saa mallin reagoimaan agg-
ressiivisemmin kustannushäiriöihin. Sen sijaan kysyntähäiriöiden suhteen ei raha-
politiikassa tällöin tapahdu muutoksia. Robustin rahapolitiikan seurauksena 
inflaatio heilahtelee näin ollen vähemmän ja kokonaistuotanto enemmän kuin ei-
robustin politiikan oloissa. Tarkasteluissa osoitetaan tosin myös, että tapahtumien 
kalenterointiin liittyvien erityisolosuhteiden vallitessa keskuspankin halu lisätä 
robustisuutta ei muuta optimaalista rahapolitiikan tavoitesääntöä eikä näin ollen 
myöskään talouden tasapainoa. 
 
Avainsanat: ei-mitattavissa oleva riski (knightilainen epävarmuus), malliepä-
varmuus, robusti ohjaus, min–max-politiikka 
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The New-Keynesian approach to macroeconomic modelling has been
dominating the monetary policy literature for almost a decade now. It has
produced several important insights in the conduct of monetary policy, and is
commonly used to provide policy prescriptions (see, eg, Clarida et al., 1999).
However, although based on the optimizing behaviour of private agents, as
a n ym o d e li tr e s t so nas e to fa s s u m p t i o n st h a tm a yo rm a yn o tb eg o o d
approximations of true economies. Since a complete description of reality
cannot be given, a policymaker is likely to prefer basing policy on principles
that are valid also if the assumptions on which the model is based diﬀer from
reality. That is, policy prescriptions should be robust to reasonable deviations
from the benchmark model.
In this paper, we explore how monetary policy in the New-Keynesian model
should be conducted in order to be robust to small changes in the speciﬁcation
of the model. We assume that the policymaker is endowed with a model
that is believed to be the most likely description of reality, but fears that
reality deviates from this model in ways that cannot be described by a known
probability distribution. The policymaker wants to avoid particularly bad
outcomes, and therefore wants policy to be robust against speciﬁcation errors
that could have particularly severe consequences.
This problem has recently been addressed by Hansen and Sargent
(2004) using ‘robust control’ techniques. Assuming that the policymaker
is unable to formulate a probability distribution over plausible models, the
robust policymaker designs policy for the worst possible outcome within a
pre-speciﬁed set of models. We apply robust control techniques developed
by Hansen and Sargent (2004) and Giodani and Söderlind (2004) to a simple
New-Keynesian model of a closed economy. Due to its simple structure, we
are able to solve the robust control problem analytically. This gives us policy
prescriptions that are more general than in the previous literature, which has
typically used numerical methods.
We analyze the eﬀects of small degrees of robustness on both optimal
instrument rules and targeting rules under two diﬀerent timing assumptions.
In the ﬁrst timing assumption, the central bank chooses its optimal policy
rule and a ﬁctitious evil agent chooses the optimal degree of misspeciﬁcation
simultaneously, leading to a Nash equilibrium. Under the second timing
assumption, the central bank chooses policy taking into account the choice
of the evil agent, thus acting as a Stackelberg leader.
In all cases but one, an increased preference for robustness makes monetary
policy respond more aggressively to cost shocks but leaves the response to
demand shocks unchanged. This is because the central bank fears that cost
shocks have larger impact on inﬂation, and it therefore counteracts these
shocks more vigorously. As a consequence, in the most likely outcome of
the model inﬂation is less volatile but output is more volatile than under
the non-robust policy. There is one exception to this rule, however: under
the Nash assumption, the optimal targeting rule is not aﬀected by the central
bank’s preference for robustness, in contrast to the optimal instrument rule.I n
this case, therefore, if the central bank implements policy through the optimal
7targeting rule, its preference for robustness has no eﬀects on the behavior of
the economy.
We begin in Section 2 by presenting the model and the general features of
the robust control problem. Section 3 derives the optimal robust policy under
the two alternative timing assumptions, and discusses the results. Section 4
concludes and relates our work to the previous literature.
2M o d e l
Our economic environment follows the standard New-Keynesian model with
sticky prices that has been used extensively in the recent literature on monetary
policy. The attractiveness of this model is due to the fact that it summarizes
the behavior of rational optimizing agents in two equations: a New-Keynesian
Phillips curve for inﬂation and a forward-looking IS equation for output.1
Thus, the benchmark model is given by
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt +Σ πε
π
t , (2.1)
xt = Etxt+1 − σ
−1[it − Etπt+1]+Σ xε
x
t, (2.2)
where πt is the rate of inﬂation (the log change in the price level), xt is
the output gap (the log deviation of output from its natural level), and it
is the one-period nominal interest rate, controlled by the central bank. The
parameters β,κ,σ are all positive with β<1, and depend on deep parameters
describing preferences and technology. In particular, β is the discount factor
of private agents, σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and κ
depends negatively on the degree of price stickiness. Finally, επ
t and εx
t are,
respectively, a cost shock (eg, a shock to ﬁrms’ markup) and a demand shock
(eg, a preference shock or a shock to the natural level of output). Although
in the literature these are often assumed to be persistent, we will assume that
they are white noise with mean zero and unit variance, as this allows for a
closed-form solution of the robust control problem. The parameters Σπ and
Σx thus determine the variance of these shocks: for instance, the variance of
the supply shock Σπεπ
t will be Σ2
π.
While the central bank sees the model (2.1)—(2.2) as the most likely
speciﬁcation, it realizes that the true model may deviate from this benchmark
model, although it is unable to specify a probability distribution for these
deviations. To model such misspeciﬁcation we follow Hansen and Sargent
(2004), and introduce in each equation a second type of disturbance, denoted
vπ
t and vx
t . These disturbances are controlled by a ﬁctitious ‘evil agent’ who
1Early derivations of this model from microfoundations can be found in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) or Goodfriend and King (1997); a thorough discussion is provided in
Clarida et al (1999) and Walshaa (2003).
8represents the policymaker’s worst fears concerning speciﬁcation errors. Thus,
the model with misspeciﬁcation is given by2





xt = Etxt+1 − σ





The speciﬁcation errors v
j
t will be allowed to feed back from the state variables,
so although the errors enter the model as additive shocks, they may well disturb
the model in the same way as multiplicative parameter uncertainty (see Hansen
and Sargent, 2004).3
To be robust against speciﬁcation errors, the central bank is assumed to
follow a min-max strategy, and design policy for the worst possible outcome
of the model, where the evil agent chooses the amount of misspeciﬁcation v
j
t
to maximize central bank loss, given some constraints (to be speciﬁed below).
This model will be referred to as the worst-case model, and is the outcome
against which the central bank wants policy to be robust. The most likely
outcome of the model, on the other hand, is one where the central bank sets
policy and agents form expectations to reﬂect misspeciﬁcation in the worst-case
model, but there is no such misspeciﬁcation in practice (so all v
j
t are zero). We
will refer to this model as the approximating model.
3 Robust monetary policy
3.1 Setting up the control problem
The central bank is assumed to minimize a standard objective function which
is quadratic in deviations of inﬂation and the output gap from their zero target
levels. To design the robust policy, the central bank takes into account a certain
degree of model misspeciﬁcation by minimizing its objective function in the
worst possible model within a given set of plausible models. Depending on
its preference for robustness, the central bank allocates a budget η to the evil
agent, which is used to create misspeciﬁcation. Thus the budget constraints
















2 ≤ η, (3.2)
2The amount of misspeciﬁcation, measured by v
j
t, is scaled by the parameter Σj,w h i c h
determines the volatility of the shock in equation j. Intuitively, the speciﬁcation error is
disguised by the disturbance term ε
j
t, so if the disturbance has no variance, the speciﬁcation
error would be detected immediately. The larger is the variance of the disturbance, the
larger can the speciﬁcation error be without being detected.
3Onatski and Williams (2003) stress that the Hansen-Sargent approach to robustness does
not capture all types of parameter uncertainty, and that the ‘robust’ rules may be fragile to
certain sources of uncertainty that are not captured by the robust control approach.
9and in a standard control problem we would have η =0 . Following Hansen and
Sargent (2004) the robust monetary policy is obtained by solving the min-max
problem subject to the model with misspeciﬁcation in equations (2.3)—(2.4)
and the evil agent’s budget constraints (3.1)—(3.2). The central bank thus sets
the interest rate to minimize the value of its intertemporal loss function, while
the evil agent sets its controls to maximize the central bank’s loss, given the
constraints on misspeciﬁcation.
As a benchmark assumption, we will assume that the central bank and the
evil agent play a Nash game, so their choice is optimal given the other player’s
choice. This is not the only possible assumption. In Section 3.3 below, we
will analyze the case where the central bank is a Stackelberg leader, and so
makes its policy choice taking into account how the evil agent will choose the
speciﬁcation errors. This will have some important consequences for the eﬀect
of robustness on policy and therefore on the economy.4
3.2 The Nash solution

































xt − Etxt+1 + σ










t are Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (2.3)—(2.4) and θ
determines the set of models available to the evil agent against which the
policymaker wants to be robust. This robustness parameter is inversely related
to the evil agent’s budget η: as the budget shrinks towards zero, so the degree
of misspeciﬁcation approaches zero, θ will approach inﬁnity.
Throughout, we will focus on marginal amounts of model misspeciﬁcation.
For suﬃciently large amounts of misspeciﬁcation, the evil agent will be
able to overturn any relationship in the model, so the approximating
model (2.1)—(2.2) is not a good description of reality. We therefore want
to consider reasonable degrees of model uncertainty that cannot be easily
identiﬁed by the policymaker.5 More speciﬁcally, we will analyze the eﬀects of
small increases in the preference for robustness starting from the non-robust
policy, ie, small decreases in θ starting from θ = ∞.
4Most applications (eg, Giordani and Söderlind, 2004) have focused on the Nash
assumption. Hansen and Sargent (10, Ch. 6) show how diﬀerent timing assumptions lead
to the same equilibrium outcome in a model without forward-looking features. This is not
the case here, where agents are forward-looking.
5In numerical approaches to robust control, the amount of misspeciﬁcation can be chosen
such that the policymaker cannot distinguish between the approximating model and the
worst-case model at reasonable statistical signiﬁcance levels. See Hansen and Sargent (2004)
and Giordani and Söderlind (2004).
10We assume that neither the central bank nor the ﬁctitious evil agent
has access to any mechanism that allows them to commit to future policies.
Consequently, we take expectations as given in the optimization and look for
a discretionary equilibrium. From the ﬁrst-order conditions we can derive the
following optimality conditions relating inﬂation, output and the degree of













t =0 . (3.6)
These optimality conditions immediately reveal some interesting features of
our model.
First, the optimal inﬂation — output trade-oﬀ in equation (3.4) is not
aﬀected by the preference for robustness. Irrespective of the central bank’s fear
of misspeciﬁcation, the robust policy does not change the optimal relationship
between the targeting variables inﬂation and output. The optimal speciﬁcation
errors in equation (3.5) increase inﬂation volatility, but do not change the
channels through which the central bank can reduce such volatility, ie, moving
output in the opposite direction. In other words, the presence of model
misspeciﬁcation will not alter the central bank’s optimal ‘targeting rule’.6
However, if instead the central bank implements policy using an ‘instrument
rule,’ ie, a rule for the interest rate, policy will be aﬀected by the preference
for robustness, since, as explained in more detail below, the central bank needs
to move the interest rate more in order to induce the appropriate changes in
the output gap.
Second, the central bank only worries about model misspeciﬁcation in the
Phillips curve, as the optimal misspeciﬁcation in the IS equation is always zero.
The policymaker is able to counteract any speciﬁcation errors in the output
equation by an appropriate adjustment of the interest rate, and these interest
rate movements do not inﬂuence central bank loss independently. Therefore
the central bank does not fear such speciﬁcation errors.
Third, the amount of misspeciﬁcation in the Phillips curve is increasing
in inﬂation and in the variance of cost shocks, Σπ. The central bank fears
inﬂationary shocks as these force the central bank to reduce the output gap
in order to achieve the desired trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and the output
gap. The evil agent adds to these shocks through misspeciﬁcation in the
Phillips curve, and increases inﬂation further when inﬂation is already high.
Furthermore, the larger is the variance of the cost shock επ
t , the more diﬃcult
it is for the central bank to identify misspeciﬁcation. Therefore the central
bank is more on its guard against speciﬁcation errors.
The optimal interest rate rule for the central bank is designed for
the worst-case model, ie, the worst possible outcome of the model, given
6Walshaa (2004) obtains a similar result in the New-Keynesian model, showing that the
optimal implicit instrument rule using robust control methods is equivalent to the robustly
optimal instrument rules of Giannoni et al (2003), and thus does not depend on the central
bank’s preference for robustness.
11the restrictions on misspeciﬁcation. This model is found by combining
the optimality conditions (3.4)—(3.6) with the model with misspeciﬁcation
in (2.3)—(2.4). As there is no persistence in the model, and the central bank is
able to completely oﬀset the eﬀects of demand shocks on the economy, the only
relevant state variable is the cost shock επ
t . Thus, the solutions for all variables
will depend on the cost shock only.7 This also implies that all expectations
are zero, a feature that makes possible an analytical solution of the model.
Setting expectations to zero and using the optimal trade-oﬀ (3.4) and the
optimal misspeciﬁcation (3.5) in the misspeciﬁed Phillips curve (2.3) then gives




































For small amounts of misspeciﬁcation, aN > 0 and bN < 0: a positive cost
shock increases inﬂation, but reduces the output gap, as the central bank
oﬀsets the shock by tightening policy. More importantly, we see that aN is
decreasing in θ and bN is increasing in θ. Thus, an increase in the preference
for robustness (a decrease in θ) leads to an increase in the absolute value of
both aN and bN. This implies that both inﬂation and output in the worst-case
model become more volatile when the preference for robustness increases.8
7Note that we allow the evil agent only to respond to the same variables as the
policymaker, ie, the cost shock. This diﬀers from the setup of Hansen and Sargent (2004)
and Giordani and Söderlind (2004), where the evil agent is allowed to respond also to lagged
state variables, thus introducing persistence in the shocks. This is because they set up the
model on its state-space form where the shocks are predetermined variables and are written
as autoregressive processes without any persistence. The set of state variables then includes
also lagged values of the shocks, and the evil agent is allowed to respond to all state variables.
In our setup, the evil agent is not allowed to introduce serial correlation in the shocks, as
there is no such persistence from the outset. This assumption is mainly for tractability,
but is also consistent with the assumption in both approaches that the evil agent is not
allowed to introduce additional state variables to increase the degree of serial correlation in
the endogenous variables.
8The worst-case solution highlights the need to focus on small degrees of misspeciﬁcation.
If we endow the evil agent with a very large budget to create speciﬁcation errors, so θ is
very small, aN and bN will take the opposite signs, so the evil agent makes inﬂation fall
and the output gap rise after a positive cost shock. This puts the policymaker in a very
diﬃcult (and unrealistic) situation. For this reason, we focus on small deviations from the
non-robust solution, so θ is close to inﬁnity. (See also Giordani and Söderlind, 2004, for a
discussion.)
12The worst-case solution for inﬂation implies that the amount of










Naturally, this is larger if Σπ is large (so speciﬁcation errors are more easily
disguised) and θ is small (so the central bank’s preference for robustness is
large). In addition, the amount of misspeciﬁcation is also larger if it is costly
for the central bank to oﬀset inﬂationary shocks, that is, if λ is large (so
oﬀsetting output movements are costly) or if κ is small (so large movements
in output are needed to aﬀect inﬂation). In the case when the central bank
attaches no weight to stabilizing output (λ =0 ), misspeciﬁcation is not a
problem, as the central bank in each period can adjust output costlessly to
oﬀset any inﬂationary shocks. Indeed, in this case inﬂation is zero in both the
worst-case model above and the approximating model below.
Given the central bank’s worst-case scenario, we can derive the optimal
interest rate rule by using the worst-case output gap (3.9) and the
optimal misspeciﬁcation (3.6) in the misspeciﬁed IS equation (2.4). Setting
expectations to zero and solving for the interest rate then gives













F o rs m a l ld e g r e e so fm i s s p e c i ﬁ c a t i o n ,cN is positive, so the central bank
responds to a positive cost shock by tightening policy, and cN is decreasing in θ.
Thus, an increased preference for robustness leads the central bank to respond
more aggressively to cost shocks, thereby increasing interest rate volatility.
This is because the central bank fears that cost shocks have larger impact on
inﬂation.9
The worst-case model derived so far represents the central bank’s worst
fears about model misspeciﬁcation, given its preference for robustness, and
the central bank designs its policy to guard against such bad outcomes. The
consequences for the economy of this policy behavior are given by the most
likely model outcome — the approximating model — where the policy rule and
agents’ expectations reﬂect the central bank’s preference for robustness, but
the actual misspeciﬁcation is zero.
The solution for the approximating model are obtained by using the optimal
robust interest rate rule from equation (3.12) in the original model (2.1)—(2.2),








9As in Hansen and Sargent (2004), we note that the optimal robust policy is not
certainty-equivalent, but the variance of cost shocks explicitly aﬀects the optimal policy
rule in equation (3.12). This is because the evil agent will allocate more misspeciﬁcation to






As there is no misspeciﬁcation in the IS equation, the approximating model for
output is the same as the worst-case model, so ¯ bN = bN. Thus an increase in
the preference for robustness will make output more volatile also in the most
likely approximating model. For inﬂation, the approximating model is given
by











which is positive and increasing in θ. Thus, an increased preference for
robustness makes inﬂation less volatile in the most likely model.
To summarize, these results imply that a central bank that wants to be
robust against model misspeciﬁcation will fear that inﬂation is more inﬂuenced
by cost shocks, and so is more volatile, as shown in equation (3.7). The
optimal policy (given by the trade-oﬀ in equation (3.4)) then implies that
the central bank induces more volatility also in output, see equation (3.9).
The fear that inﬂation is more volatile leads the policymaker to contract the
economy more in response to positive cost shocks, inducing more volatility
in the interest rate, see equation (3.12). In the most likely model (the
model without misspeciﬁcation), this volatility in the interest rate leads to
more output volatility but less volatility in inﬂation, see equations (3.14)
and (3.16). As monetary policy responds more aggressively to cost shocks
when the central bank’s preference for robustness increases, the eﬀects of these
shocks on inﬂation are dampened, but at the cost of more output volatility.
3.3 The Stackelberg solution
Although the Nash timing assumption has been more commonly used in
applied work, we now analyze an alternative timing assumption, where the
central bank acts as a Stackelberg leader and designs policy taking into account










t =0 . (3.19)
10We are grateful to Carl Walsh for suggesting this alternative timing assumption.
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πt ≡− ASπt. (3.21)
While in the Nash model the optimal trade-oﬀ is independent of the preference
for robustness, this is no longer true in the Stackelberg model, when the central
bank foresees the evil agent’s choice and adapts its policy accordingly. Now
the trade-oﬀ is steeper than in the Nash model (AS is larger than AN), so the
central bank implicitly puts more weight on stabilizing inﬂation than in the
Nash model. Moreover, a larger preference for robustness makes the trade-oﬀ
even steeper (AS increases), further increasing the implicit weight on stabilizing
inﬂation.
Again we ﬁnd the worst-case model for inﬂation by setting expectations
to zero and using the optimal trade-oﬀ (3.21) and the optimal
misspeciﬁcation (3.5) in the misspeciﬁed Phillips curve (2.3). This yields













π/θ)2 + κ2, (3.23)
which is positive when the preference for robustness is small. Similarly, the





bS ≡− ASaS = −
κ
λ(1 − Σ2
π/θ)2 + κ2, (3.25)
which is negative and increasing in θ. Because the trade-oﬀ is steeper in the
Stackelberg model than in the Nash model, inﬂation is less volatile (aS <
aN), but output is more volatile (|bS| > |bN|). An increased preference for
robustness makes output in the worst-case model more volatile (because the
trade-oﬀ becomes steeper), while the eﬀect on inﬂation depends on parameters.
If κ is large relative to λ, inﬂation in the worst-case model becomes less volatile
15when the preference for robustness increases, so aS falls, but if κ is small
relative to λ we get the opposite eﬀect.11











which is smaller than in the Nash solution, but is still increasing in Σπ and λ
and decreasing in θ and κ.
The optimal policy rule is given by









cS ≡− σbS =
σκ
λ(1 − Σ2
π/θ)2 + κ2, (3.28)
which is positive and decreasing in θ. As in the Nash model, the central
bank counters inﬂationary shocks by increasing the interest rate (cS > 0)f o r
small degrees of misspeciﬁcation, but the central bank now foresees the evil
agent’s choice and responds more aggressively, so cS >c N. An increase in the
preference for robustness will increase cS further and make the interest rate
more volatile.












π/θ)2 + κ2, (3.30)
so again ¯ bS = bS as there is no misspeciﬁcation in the IS equation. For inﬂation
we obtain





















































whose sign depends on the relative size of κ and λ.
16where
¯ aS ≡ 1+κ¯ bS =1−
κ2
λ(1 − Σ2
π/θ)2 + κ2, (3.32)
which is positive and increasing in θ.
We note that ¯ aS is positive and smaller than ¯ aN for small degrees of
misspeciﬁcation. Conversely, ¯ bS is negative and larger (in absolute terms)
than ¯ bN. Increasing the preference for robustness will increase ¯ bS in absolute
terms, just as bS, but decrease ¯ aS, so inﬂation becomes less volatile and output
becomes more volatile in the approximating model.
In the Stackelberg model the central bank knows that the worst-case
misspeciﬁcation raises inﬂation volatility, and it guards against these fears by
focusing more on reducing inﬂation volatility, at the cost of increased volatility
in the output gap. Thus, the optimal trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output in
equation (3.21) is steeper and monetary policy responds more aggressively to
inﬂationary shocks in the Stackelberg model. This implies that inﬂation in the
approximating model is less volatile than in the Nash solution, while output
is more volatile.
A larger preference for robustness makes the central bank focus even
more on reducing inﬂation volatility, giving an even steeper trade-oﬀ in
equation (3.21), and the central bank puts more weight on reducing inﬂation
volatility, again at the cost of more volatility in output. Thus, the interest rate
and output become more volatile, while inﬂation in the approximating model
becomes less volatile. The only ambiguity concerns the eﬀects on inﬂation
in the worst-case model. On the one hand, an increase in the preference for
robustness makes the central bank reduce inﬂation volatility more aggressively,
but on the other hand, the evil agent induces more volatility in inﬂation. In
the Nash solution, where the trade-oﬀ did not depend on the preference for
robustness, the net eﬀect was a reduction in inﬂation volatility, but in the
Stackelberg model, there is also an eﬀect through the optimal trade-oﬀ, and
the net eﬀect depends on parameter values.
Comparing the two solutions, we see that the weight on output stabilization
in the Nash model, λ, is everywhere multiplied by the term (1 − Σ2
π/θ) in the
Stackelberg model. For suﬃciently large θ, this term is positive but smaller
than one, so the central bank in the Stackelberg model behaves as a Nash
central bank with a larger weight on stabilizing inﬂation (a smaller λ). As
the preference for robustness increases, this weight increases further, and the
diﬀerence between the Nash central bank and the Stackelberg central bank
becomes greater. However, although the choice of timing assumption matters
for the quantitative results — the size of response coeﬃcients and the eﬀects
of increased robustness — the qualitative results under the two assumptions
are the same when the central bank implements policy using the optimal
instrument rule.
When policy is implemented using the optimal targeting rule,t h i si s
no longer true. In the Nash solution, the optimal targeting rule given by
equation (3.4) is independent of the preference for robustness, so if policy
is implemented using the targeting rule, the central bank’s preference for
robustness will not aﬀect the behavior of the economy. In the Stackelberg
17solution this is no longer the case: if policy is implemented using the optimal
targeting rule (3.21) rather than the interest rate rule (3.27), the approximating
model is given by
























Thus, under the Stackelberg targeting rule policy, increasing the preference for
robustness makes inﬂation in the approximating model less volatile and output
more volatile, as the central bank implicitly puts more weight on stabilizing
inﬂation rather than output. These results mimic those under the optimal
instrument rule under either the Nash or the Stackelberg assumption.
4 Conclusions
Our analysis shows that a central bank that wants to be robust against
particularly bad outcomes will typically respond more aggressively to cost
shocks, as the central bank fears that inﬂationary shocks have larger eﬀects on
the economy. As a consequence, inﬂation is more stable and output more
volatile than under the standard non-robust policy. Moreover, the policy
response to demand shocks is not aﬀected by the preference for robustness,
as the central bank is always able to neutralize the impact of such shocks
on output and inﬂation by appropriate (and costless) changes in the interest
rate. We have shown these results to hold for the optimal instrument rule
under both the Nash and Stackelberg timing assumptions as well as for the
optimal targeting rule under the Stackelberg assumption. Under the Nash
assumption, however, the optimal targeting rule is not aﬀected by the central
bank’s preference for robustness, as in Walshaa (2003).
The result that a preference for robustness leads to more volatility in the
interest rate is reminiscent of that in Söderström (2002). Using a Bayesian
approach in a backward-looking model, he shows that increased uncertainty
about the persistence of inﬂation makes monetary policy more aggressive, as
the central bank wants to reduce the probability that inﬂation moves away
from the target in the future. Here there is no persistence in inﬂation, so
current inﬂation has no information about its future path, but as the robust
central bank fears that inﬂation is more responsive to shocks, the central bank
responds more aggressively to these shocks.
Results similar to ours have also been reached within the applied robust
control literature, using numerical methods. For instance, Giordani and
18Söderlind (2004) analyze optimal robust policy (under both commitment
and discretion) in the standard New-Keynesian model with persistent shocks.
They show that robustness makes the central bank fear that shocks are more
persistent, and therefore the optimal robust policy is more aggressive than the
non-robust policy. That result is valid for typical parameterizations of the
model. Although our model does not include persistence, we are able to show
that robustness always leads to more aggressive policy, in any parameterization
of the model.
Giannoniaa (2002) also studies the New-Keynesian with persistent demand
shocks, where the central bank is uncertain about the slope of the IS equation
and the Phillips curve, but the private sector faces no such uncertainty.
Calculating optimized Taylor rule parameters, he ﬁnds that monetary policy is
always more aggressive when uncertainty increases, as the central bank puts a
larger weight on stabilizing inﬂation and output relative to smoothing interest
rates.
We expect our conclusions to be fairly robust as long as two assumptions
are fulﬁlled: the central bank inﬂuences inﬂation through aggregate demand
only, with no other inﬂuence of the interest rate on inﬂation; and interest
rate ﬂuctuations in themselves do not aﬀect social loss. The ﬁrst of these
assumptions is common in the closed-economy literature. In a companion
paper (Leitemo and Söderström, 2004), we extend the analysis to consider
a New-Keynesian model of a small open economy, in which policy moves
inﬂuence the economy also through the exchange rate. In that paper, we
ﬁnd that there is a role for speciﬁcation errors also in the IS equation, as the
central bank cannot costlessly oﬀset demand shocks without aﬀecting inﬂation
through the exchange rate. Furthermore, we show that robust policy can be
either more or less aggressive than the non-robust policy, depending on the
type of shock and the source of misspeciﬁcation. Another extension that may
change our conclusions is when social loss depends directly on ﬂuctuations in
the interest rate, as in Giannoni and Woodford (2003). Also in that case,
policy moves would be costly, introducing a role for speciﬁcation errors in the
IS equation.
We believe that policymaking in practice to a large extent is about avoiding
particularly bad outcomes, either due to policy or to private sector behaviour.
Given our limited understanding of the economy, robust control techniques
provide a methodology to identify and avoid policy moves that risk moving
the economy toward bad states. Of course, there are alternative techniques
to analyze optimal policy under uncertainty, in particular, the Bayesian ap-
proach pioneered by Brainard (1967). This approach tends to suggest that
policy should be more attenuated in the face of uncertainty, in order to reduce
the impact of uncertainty on the outcome.12 These recommendations are in-
tuitively appealing. Intuition also tells us, however, that policy actions under
uncertainty need to be resolute in order to avoid particularly bad outcomes,
as in the robust control approach. Thus, both approaches seem to capture
important aspects of the scenario facing policymakers, and therefore provide
insights into the optimal behavior of policy in an uncertain world.
12Exceptions to this rule are demonstrated by Craine (1979) and Söderström (2002).
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